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This story is the first of a two-part series by The Texas Tribune and Public Health Watch. Read part two here.
In Deer Park, Danny Hardy found himself in the third-row pew of Deer Park First Baptist Church when a sudden wave of buzzing cellphones seized the attention of the congregation. The quick movements of several men in the pews caught everyone’s eye – these were the brave first responders or diligent employees of the numerous refineries and chemical plants in close proximity.
Hardy, the leader of the church security team and a retired police officer, remained unfazed. Having resided in the Houston suburb of Deer Park for almost four decades, he had grown accustomed to witnessing refinery flares illuminating the night sky, catching occasional whiffs of chemical odors, and hearing distant sirens wail. Deer Park, nestled in the epicenter of North America’s petrochemical industry, naturally encountered these occurrences as part of its everyday life.
However, as murmurs of discussion began to circulate among the worshippers, it became evident that this particular emergency alert, which occurred on Sunday, March 17, 2019, carried a unique significance. Following a brief period of tension, Wayne Riddle, a former mayor, took center stage and addressed the crowded worship center.
An accident had occurred, causing a massive fire in a facility containing millions of barrels of highly unstable chemicals, situated just over 2 miles away. As a precautionary measure, city officials had released a shelter-in-place advisory to ensure the safety of residents.
From a window, Hardy observed a colossal plume of pitch-black smoke enveloping the sky. He directed a group comprising 30 deacons and volunteers to switch off the air-conditioning system and secure the exits. It was imperative for everyone to remain indoors, shielded from any hazardous fumes that could be present outside.
The parishioners were calmed by the choir’s worship song, which went like this: “Raise your voice / It’s the jubilee year / And from the hill of Zion / Salvation arrives.”
* * *
Ken Garing, who was in Boulder, Colorado, received an email regarding the rapidly spreading chemical fire in Southeast Texas after a lapse of four hours and a distance of 1,000 miles.
Garing, a chemical engineer with three decades of experience, had dedicated his career to investigating severe cases of industrial pollution for a branch of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. His body tensed as he observed the fire breaking out at Deer Park’s Intercontinental Terminals Company, commonly known as ITC.
Garing had been to the 265-acre chemical storage facility on two occasions, in 2013 and 2016. On both visits, he was deeply unsettled by what he witnessed. Alarming quantities of chemicals were escaping into the atmosphere from numerous colossal tanks owned by ITC, with benzene, a cancer-causing carcinogen known to induce leukemia, being one of the substances being released.
He recalled exclaiming, “Wow!” Their benzene levels inside the facility were significantly higher than any we had ever witnessed before,” he stated. “An unfortunate incident seemed inevitable at ITC. It was only a question of when.”
A 10-month investigation by Public Health Watch found that Garing was one of many state and federal scientists who documented problems at ITC long before catastrophe struck. The fire didn’t just punctuate years of government negligence — it revealed regulatory failures familiar to communities that experience chemical disasters, including the recent train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio. The pattern is a common one: State and federal officials know for years of a looming danger but repeatedly fail to correct it. And then, after an accident occurs, they fail to adequately protect those who are harmed.
Based on extensive research, including thousands of pages of state and federal documents, investigative reports, pollution data from the EPA, and firsthand accounts from Deer Park residents, the unfolding of this pattern in the tight-knit city of 30,000, known as the “Birthplace of Texas,” comes to light. Additionally, retired government regulators, who had previously attempted to raise concerns about ITC, are now speaking out in an effort to avert future disasters.
* * *
Located on the northern outskirts of Deer Park, ITC’s 227 chemical storage tanks stand as imposing symbols of Texas’ influential petrochemical industry. Mitsui Group, a prominent corporation based in Japan, owns this facility, which plays a crucial role in storing and distributing toxic chemicals, noxious gases, and petroleum products necessary for the numerous chemical plants and refineries in the region. It facilitates the transportation of these products from freighters to railways, barges to pipelines, and tankers to refineries. With an extensive network of over 20,000 feet of rail lines, five shipping docks, and ten barge docks connected to the Houston Ship Channel, the facility is strategically positioned just 17 miles away from downtown Houston.
For almost a century, the petrochemical industry has been deeply integrated into Deer Park. Serving as the city’s primary employer, it not only contributes significantly to civic activities but also plays a pivotal role in supporting the local community. Particularly, the industry has established strong connections with Deer Park’s schools, which, alongside the availability of lucrative industry positions, serve as major attractions for families. In fact, when the town’s school district was established in 1930, its board convened at the nearby Shell refinery, highlighting the close relationship between education and the petrochemical sector.
However, in July 2004, Tim Doty and his team of 14 scientists from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), the state’s environmental regulatory agency, were primarily concerned with identifying potential risks that the industry could pose to the town of Deer Park.
At the time, the TCEQ had only been in existence for just over ten years, yet it was already facing strong criticism from environmental advocates. Houston Mayor Bill White, a Democrat, was particularly vocal in his opposition as his city struggled to combat air pollution. Houston was dubbed the nation’s fifth most polluted city by the American Lung Association that year, with emissions from Deer Park and nearby towns exacerbating the issue. Mayor White urged the TCEQ to enhance regulations and impose higher fines on those who repeatedly violated the federal Clean Air Act.
Doty had been monitoring industrial emissions since 1990, when he joined the Texas Air Control Board, an organization that preceded the TCEQ. His exceptional skills in deciphering intricate chemical data had established him as one of the most astute investigators within the agency. His unwavering dedication had earned him the reputation of being one of the most tenacious individuals on the team.
Chemical readings around ITC had been previously conducted by Doty’s mobile monitoring team.
In 2002, the scientists working under his supervision made a shocking discovery. They detected alarming amounts of benzene and other hazardous substances in the vicinity of the facility. These substances included toluene, commonly found in nail polish and explosives, as well as 1,3-butadiene, a known carcinogen used in the production of plastic and rubber goods. The emissions were so potent that three scientists working for Doty reported experiencing symptoms such as burning throats, nasal irritation, and watery eyes.
However, no fines were imposed as a result of the incident. From 2002 to 2004, the TCEQ, responsible for enforcing the federal Clean Air Act in the state, penalized ITC only once, specifically for equipment issues rather than chemical leaks. The majority of the limited fines faced by the company during that time were imposed by the Federal Railroad Administration and the EPA.
Doty’s team arrived in Deer Park in July 2004, only six months after ITC had unlawfully discharged 101 pounds of 1,3-butadiene into the atmosphere. Surprisingly, no penalties were imposed, and just 16 days later, the TCEQ granted ITC authorization to install another tank of 1,3-butadiene. Furthermore, the TCEQ extended the facility’s 10-year chemical permit, which is essential for any company emitting pollution as part of its regular operations.
In July, the scientists from TCEQ dedicated nearly a week to thoroughly inspecting Deer Park and its neighboring communities in search of unauthorized emissions. Working tirelessly for 13 to 14 hours daily, they strategically identified emission origins at the boundaries of different facilities using triangulation techniques.
Their top priority swiftly shifted to the corner of Tidal Road and Independence Parkway.
Nearby were two hazardous waste facilities and a chemical plant that produced chlorine and caustic soda, essential components in soap production and food preservation. However, the ITC storage compound overshadowed the area, occupying the intersection. It consisted of tanks containing volatile fuels, as well as residual substances from the refining process. Each tank was assigned a number, enabling ITC and regulatory authorities to monitor its emissions and compliance history over the years. Referred to as the “2nd 80’s,” these tanks had a capacity of 80,000 barrels each, numbered from 80-1 to 80-15. All of them were constructed during the 1970s.
Doty stated that the intersection was the epicenter of benzene contamination. Numerous chemical sources were present in the vicinity, but ITC was located right in the heart of it. It held great significance and was one of our primary areas of concern.
The scientists employed handheld vapor analyzers to get approximate readings of airborne chemicals. Air samples were collected using small metal canisters, which were later examined at the TCEQ laboratory. However, their most powerful tools were the 16-foot box vans, equipped with 30-foot weather masts for monitoring wind direction and small ovens that quickly analyzed air samples by individually incinerating chemicals.
The scientists’ findings led to a follow-up inspection by the TCEQ. They were also summarized in an internal memo to seven agency officials, including the directors of the offices of compliance and enforcement and air permitting.
According to the memo, it was reported that elevated levels of benzene and 1,3-butadiene were discovered near the intersection of Tidal Road and Independence Parkway. The suspected party, ITC, had received a notice of violation which outlines the issues the company needs to rectify. The memo further stated that ITC had released a continuous concentration of 720 parts per billion of benzene within an hour, which was deemed as a violation of their permit.
However, once again ITC was let off the hook by the TCEQ.
After rectifying the defective tanks, the company announced that necessary measures had been taken, thus concluding the matter. Subsequently, a year later, the TCEQ granted ITC approval for the installation of 48 additional tanks.
To Doty, these choices served as further evidence of the TCEQ prioritizing industry interests over public safety.
He expressed his frustration, stating that his team consistently strived to do what was right. However, he acknowledged that whether TCEQ effectively took any substantial measures was a separate matter.
* * *
ITC’s “2nd 80’s” faced another issue in December 2006.
After a malfunction in a pressurized valve, emergency responders swiftly arrived at Tidal Road. The malfunction caused the release of 2,076 pounds of pyrolysis gasoline, commonly known as pygas, which dispersed into the air, contaminated the ground, and reached a water-filled ditch on the roadside.
Pygas contains abundant amounts of benzene and toluene, which, when exposed to, can result in a range of symptoms including dizziness, irregular heartbeats, and potential kidney damage. In cases of extremely high concentrations, these chemicals have the potential to be fatal.
For a span of 13 hours, Harris County investigators took charge of the situation on Tidal Road, ensuring the contaminated area was secured and collecting air and water samples. Notably, Harris County encompasses Houston, Deer Park, and various other towns with significant industrial activity.
The accident caught the attention of county officials who were growing increasingly frustrated with the leniency of the TCEQ. As a result, they were intensifying their own air monitoring and investigative efforts.
Harris County sued ITC over the pygas leak, alleging that the facility had committed six separate violations of the Texas Clean Air Act and the Texas Water Code. In their petition, the prosecutors said they were confident the case would warrant a penalty as high as $150,000 “because of the compliance history of ITC.”
Less than six months after another incident at ITC, Harris County revised its petition. Tank 50-2, located near Tidal Road in the “2nd 80’s” section of the facility, had a fourth emissions violation within four minutes, resulting in the release of approximately 1,800 pounds of 1,3-butadiene. This area had previously recorded elevated levels of benzene three years ago, as observed by Tim Doty and his team of TCEQ scientists.
Doty’s team has embarked on four additional weeklong investigative trips to Deer Park, gathering new data on the concerning benzene emissions of ITC. After each trip, Doty diligently reported on the identified issues in his post-trip reports.
He explained, “I generated comprehensive narratives and stories that would be easily understandable for anyone, including journalists, who wanted to know more about the events occurring at ITC. Our objective was to demonstrate the consistent nature of ITC’s issues, proving that they were not isolated incidents.”
Once more, the TCEQ refrained from imposing any penalties.
In 2008, ITC settled the lawsuit with Harris County for $95,250 for five chemical leaks caused by operator error. The company agreed to abide by environmental laws and implement better management practices — a promise it failed to keep. After another chemical accident caused by operator error the following year, Harris County sued again. This time ITC settled for $90,000.
* * *
Elvia Guevara settled into her new residence just 4 miles away from the chemical tanks of ITC, even as the company was busy defending itself against regulators.
When she and her husband, Lalo, relocated to Deer Park in 2008, they discovered that the comfortably middle-class community surpassed all their expectations. This Houston suburb was not only small and intimate, but also incredibly safe. Its well-designed neighborhoods boasted immaculate streets, expansive yards, and spacious two-story houses. Additionally, its advantageous proximity to petrochemical facilities ensured shorter commutes to work.
Guevara efficiently handled the logistics for a chemical company located nearby, ensuring smooth operations at all times. Meanwhile, her husband held the position of a railroad tech manager, responsible for repairing rail lines near ITC. The industry had been immensely beneficial for their family, enabling them to relocate from Pasadena, a neighboring city with lesser affluence. Moreover, it provided them with a stable income to provide for their three sons, Eddie, Anthony, and Adrian.
Guevara mentioned that they didn’t prioritize considering the potential risks of chemical leaks and similar incidents. Living in a community surrounded by chemical companies seemed ordinary to them.
Without Guevara’s knowledge, the EPA, the organization responsible for overseeing the proper regulation of companies in Texas, was going through a chaotic phase. Debbie Ford, a resolute regulator, had a prime view of the situation.
In August 2008, Ford started her role as an air enforcement inspector for EPA Region 6 in Dallas. This region is responsible for monitoring federal environmental regulations in Texas, Louisiana, and three additional states. Ford’s upbringing was mainly in Lake Charles, Louisiana, where her father held the position of medical director at a refinery. Following the completion of her master’s degree in environmental science, she joined the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) for employment.
Ford quickly rose through the ranks of the agency, thanks to her impressive skills in deciphering complex chemical permits and mastering intricate air pollution regulations. In just six years, she attained the esteemed position of senior air technical inspector at her regional office and became one of the DEQ’s highly regarded technical experts, particularly renowned for her expertise in chemical tanks.
However, Ford’s steadfast approach gained her a reputation as a “troublemaker” in a state that, much like Texas, is recognized for its relaxed approach to enforcement. Instead of succumbing to the political pressure and cautious regulatory measures that frequently influenced the agency, Ford persisted, much to the displeasure of her superiors.
Ford stated that, in their perspective, the situation was straightforward: the regulations were established and it was expected that everyone would comply with them. However, certain companies managed to evade the rules and obtain lenient permits due to their influential status within the state.
Ford believed that becoming a part of the EPA would increase her opportunities to create a significant influence. However, she quickly discovered that the agency’s authority, as mandated by the Clean Air Act, is quite restricted. Although the act assigns the EPA with the task of supervising the execution of federal regulations, it predominantly places the responsibility of enforcing these regulations on individual states. Similar to parents attempting to control their occasionally unruly children, the EPA’s ten regions frequently find themselves having to persuade and negotiate with their state counterparts.
Public Health Watch was informed by multiple present and past EPA officials that Region 6 adopted a conciliatory stance when interacting with states like Texas and Louisiana that were supportive of the industry. These officials mentioned that the region’s inclination to be lenient towards those who violated the Clean Air Act was widely recognized not only among other EPA regions but also within the agency’s headquarters in Washington, D.C.
Ford found herself ill-equipped for Region 6’s casual approach. Upon her initial visit to the office in downtown Dallas, she discovered a lack of prepared assignments and minimal knowledge regarding the constantly changing federal air pollution regulations that she was responsible for enforcing. She also observed a co-worker frequently dozing off at a nearby desk and overheard a superior cautioning another manager, “We mustn’t reveal too soon the limited productivity within our department.”
When questioned by Public Health Watch about this exchange, Region 6 responded by stating that they are unable to confirm the accuracy of the overheard statement.
What she saw left Ford in a state of shock.
The continuous thought running through my mind was, “How did I end up in this situation?”
* * *
In 2009, Ford’s optimism grew when President Barack Obama selected Alfredo “Al” Armendariz, a professor of engineering at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, to take charge of Region 6.
Armendariz’s appointment brought joy to environmentalists due to his history of criticizing state regulators for their inadequate enforcement methods. However, Texas officials and industry groups vehemently opposed his appointment, particularly due to a paper he had authored prior to assuming the role. The paper revealed that natural-gas drilling in the Dallas-Fort Worth region produced almost equivalent levels of smog and greenhouse gases as the area’s congested traffic, further fueling their anger.
After serving for eight months, Armendariz forwarded a 44-slide PowerPoint presentation to his superiors in Washington, requesting additional resources for the Dallas office. He presented a compelling case, emphasizing that Region 6 housed a significant number of petrochemical facilities compared to other regions. Despite this, it had the sixth-lowest number of staff members among the ten regions and lacked the necessary tools to effectively enforce the Clean Air Act.
During the spring of 2011, over 25 Texas officials, including former Governor Rick Perry, established a task force with the aim of countering what they perceived as excessively intrusive policies by the EPA. In 2012, a video surfaced that led to Armendariz losing his job. In the video, he likened his approach to enforcing regulations to Roman crucifixions, suggesting that by punishing wrongdoers, the EPA would encourage the rest of the industry to regulate itself.
Despite Armendariz’s apology for his word choice, the repercussions of his remarks were already irreversible. The TCEQ condemned his comments as “outrageous” and “unacceptable and disgraceful.” Perry took to Twitter, expressing that Armendariz’s statements provided further justification for drastically reducing the power of the EPA.
Armendariz stepped down four days later.
* * *
In spite of the ongoing turmoil within the leadership of Region 6, the dedicated personnel in the air enforcement division persevered.
EPA investigators arrived unexpectedly in Deer Park on October 10, 2012, to conduct an inspection at ITC. Similar to Doty’s TCEQ team from eight years prior, their objective was to find benzene. However, this time they ventured inside the facility to closely examine its tanks.
Dan Hoyt, an environmental engineer from Region 6, served as the lead investigator and had valid concerns regarding ITC. Analysis of data retrieved from stationary air monitors in the vicinity indicated the presence of alarmingly elevated levels of benzene emissions either within or in close proximity to the establishment.
To effectively monitor emissions in extensive tank farms, one must possess patience, precision, advanced equipment, and undergo thorough training. Detecting airborne leaks is impossible through visual observation alone, hence investigators rely on heat-tracking infrared cameras to detect them. Through black-and-white videos, they are able to visualize clouds of vapors flowing through the vents situated on the upper portion of each tank.
Hoyt had a photoionization detector that provided immediate readings, but due to the large quantity of tanks and their close proximity, it was challenging to identify the exact sources of the leaks. The tanks were quite massive, measuring 40 feet tall and 120 feet in diameter, which made it difficult to track the movement of air within the complex. This monitoring aspect was crucial but presented a significant challenge.
At the conclusion of their three-day inspection, the investigators had evaluated 98 out of the total 231 tanks at the facility.
Shortly after ITC had submitted an application to renew its TCEQ chemical permit for another decade, Hoyt forwarded a preliminary version of his report to Ford, who had assumed the role of Region 6’s tank specialist.
Ford had received numerous inspection reports, but it was Hoyt’s draft that caught her attention. The findings in the final section, titled “Areas of Concern,” were particularly alarming, according to her.
Public Health Watch acquired a copy of the final report through a Freedom of Information Act request. It identified 10 tanks that might be exceeding their permitted limits for volatile organic compounds emissions. Four of them — 80-2, 80-7, 80-9 and 80-12 — were near Tidal Road, in the same section Doty and the TCEQ team had worried about eight years earlier.
Region 6 proceeded by summoning the EPA’s emissions “SWAT” team.
The NEIC, short for the National Enforcement Investigations Center, is a Denver-based branch of the EPA. Annually, it tackles numerous intricate cases of industrial pollution, making it the go-to resource for regional offices in need of expert knowledge and experienced investigators.
Garing was a highly experienced chemical engineer who possessed extensive knowledge of the petrochemical industry. Prior to joining the NEIC in 1987, he had worked as a chemical engineer at Conoco. With a rich background, having inspected close to 100 plants and refineries, Garing was the ideal candidate when Region 6 approached him to assess benzene emissions in eastern Harris County.
In April 2013, Garing embarked on a multi-day journey in a specially-designed van equipped with state-of-the-art technology called Geospatial Measurement of Air Pollution (GMAP). This innovative machine, worth $100,000, generated a comprehensive 3D emissions map, providing real-time data on chemical spikes. Upon examining the map, it became evident to Garing that ITC was facing a significant issue with benzene contamination.
Region 6 added Garing’s findings to a draft of a formal document called a Clean Air Act Section 114 Information Collection Request. If the region wanted to move forward with enforcement, sending the 114 to ITC was a critical way to gather key details and documents.
Public Health Watch obtained a 13-page draft, requested through public records, that outlined numerous maintenance issues and mechanical faults in five tanks. These tanks, namely tanks 80-2, 80-7, and 80-15, were part of ITC’s “2nd 80’s” group, which had been previously flagged by Doty in 2004 and Hoyt in 2012.
However, it seems that Region 6’s attempt to crack down on ITC ended right there.
After the inspection, there is no evidence indicating that the 114 has been finalized or sent to ITC. Furthermore, there are no records of fines being imposed or any corrective measures being implemented.
According to officials at the EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., when Public Health Watch inquired about why ITC did not face penalties following the inspection, they explained that “after subsequent compliance discussions with the company and a thorough review of the evidence, Region 6 decided not to pursue formal enforcement actions against ITC.”
* * *
On November 14, 2016, Garing and the team of specialists from the EPA paid a second visit to ITC. This time, Region 6 specifically requested them to carry out a comprehensive inspection within the facility, in close proximity to the tanks.
As Garing stepped into the complex, the cool Texas air carried a pungent scent of chemicals that lingered heavily. Along the road, towering cylindrical tanks stood like vigilant guardsmen, while trains filled with petrochemicals rumbled in close proximity.
Garing’s white Chevrolet Express was fitted with a range of cutting-edge pollution-tracking features. Positioned on the rooftop were two devices – an air monitor for monitoring wind movements and a 4-foot metal mast linked to a fan that collected atmospheric samples. The powerful vacuum required a total of seven car batteries to operate efficiently.
Upon entering the mast, the air samples proceeded through a plastic tube resembling a Slinky, eventually reaching the GMAP machine. Inside this machine, the samples encountered an ultraviolet light that bounced back and forth between two mirrors. As certain compounds have distinct light absorption properties at specific wavelengths, the GMAP machine could instantaneously determine the presence and concentrations of particular chemicals. The data was promptly transmitted to a laptop placed in the front seat, providing Garing with immediate information about the substances present in the environment he was traversing.
When emissions were at a low level, the GMAP’s depictions resembled short and green bar graphs. However, when emissions were high, they transformed into bright red formations resembling tall fences, stacked one on top of the other.
Garing had utilized the GMAP for over three years, yet he expressed that he had never witnessed benzene levels as elevated as the ones it detected within ITC on that specific day. Within a certain area of the establishment, the readings surpassed 1,000 parts per billion, which is more than 10 times higher than the recommended limit established by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health for the safety of workers.
Garing noted that as we examined our maps, an abundance of red markings caught our attention. Typically, one or two tanks exhibit high emissions, but what we observed was a cluster of tanks displaying elevated levels.
He added, “There was definitely something off about it. It appeared highly suspicious.”
Public Health Watch acquired a copy of the NEIC’s post-trip inspection report, dated April 2017, through a Freedom of Information Act request.
Garing’s GMAP data summarized a significant number of high benzene readings and identified their potential sources. While some emissions seemed to originate from a neighboring facility, the majority could be traced back to ITC. Specifically, five flagged tanks, namely 80-2, 80-6, 80-7, 80-10, and 80-14, were located in the problematic “2nd 80’s” section near Tidal Road. Interestingly, the highest benzene readings were detected near tank 50-2, which was also responsible for the notable 1,3-butadiene leak that led to Harris County’s initial lawsuit against ITC.
According to the report, it is recommended to thoroughly analyze all the accessible data before determining whether additional investigation is necessary.
Region 6 received the findings of NEIC and was tasked with investigating if any of the elevated benzene levels surpassed ITC’s permit.
Similar to 2012, the attempt to restrict ITC seems to have halted.
Region 6 has no documented evidence of having prepared a 114 letter, which is an essential requirement before enforcement actions are taken. Furthermore, there are no records indicating the imposition of fines or the implementation of any corrective measures subsequent to the inspection.
Public Health Watch inquired with ITC about the receipt of a 114 letter subsequent to NEIC’s inspection. The company’s response was indirect as a spokesperson stated, “We addressed all concerns raised by the staff during that period, and as of now, ITC has no knowledge of any additional measures undertaken or required.”
The leaders of Region 6 were requested by Public Health Watch for an interview regarding their reasons for not imposing any penalties on ITC following the region’s inspection in 2012, the NEIC’s benzene screening in 2013, and the NEIC’s inspection in 2016. In response to this request, Joe Robledo, the spokesperson for Region 6, emailed the following response.
Although the inspections revealed areas of concern and the presence of visible hydrocarbon emissions from certain tanks at the facility, the EPA’s review of the inspection results did not pinpoint any specific instances of noncompliance. It is important to note that the EPA does not anticipate tanks with fixed roofs, internal floating roofs, or external floating roofs to achieve complete emission control. Therefore, the observation of emissions from tanks does not necessarily constitute a violation of a permit or federal standard.
* * *
In August 2018, the eldest son of Elvia and Lalo Guevara followed in his parents’ footsteps and joined them in the petrochemical industry.
At the age of 18, while attending night classes at San Jacinto College, Eddie began his career as a contractor. Merely three months later, he secured a full-time position at a chemical company and made the decision to discontinue his education. Remarkably, Eddie’s starting salary was an impressive $70,000.
Similar to numerous Deer Park residents, Eddie had little interest in the regulatory actions (or lack thereof) of the TCEQ towards the local facilities that contributed to the prosperity of their community. The consistent maintenance issues and environmental concerns of ITC seldom received media coverage. Over the course of 2002 until now, the combined penalties imposed by the TCEQ, EPA, and Harris County on ITC amounted to a mere $270,728. This figure was insignificant when compared to the Mitsui Group, the owner of ITC, which boasted profits of $7.2 billion in 2018 alone.
* * *
The events that unfolded on the evening of Saturday, March 16, 2019, at ITC’s “2nd 80’s” initiated a chain of events that garnered national attention due to the facility’s emissions issues. Detailed accounts of the incident were provided by the Harris County Fire Marshal’s Office and the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board.
According to the preliminary report from the safety board, at approximately 7:30 p.m., operators commenced the process of unloading two truckloads of butane into tank 80-8. This tank was intended to store the highly flammable liquid, which would later be combined with naphtha – a gasoline ingredient – to enhance the octane level of the fuel. Once the trucks were emptied, an external pump was left operational to facilitate the ongoing mixing of the product.
The following day, there was a sudden decrease in pressure within tank 80-8, indicating a potential leak. At approximately 9:30 a.m., over 9,000 gallons of the naphtha-butane mixture were released onto the ground. According to the safety board report, the tank farm lacked a permanent gas detection system that could have activated alarms to alert employees about the emergency.
Approximately thirty minutes later, the fire marshal’s office provided a detailed account of the incident. During a tank test conducted by an ITC supervisor, the sound of metal grinding could be heard in the background. Mistaking it for two rail cars coupling together, the supervisor paid little attention to it.
Shortly after, he caught sight of flames erupting from a tank positioned approximately two football fields away. Although uncertain of its exact identity, he observed that it occupied a central position within the notorious “2nd 80’s” area – a section that had been a cause for concern among TCEQ and EPA inspectors for a minimum of 15 years due to its excessive emissions.
According to the fire marshal’s report, the tank farm lacked an automated fire alarm system. Consequently, the supervisor swiftly took action by seizing his handheld radio to notify the facility’s emergency response team. Simultaneously, he hurried over to the nearby security office and activated the fire alarm.
Tank 80-8’s valves were incapable of being closed remotely, as stated by the safety board. In order to shut them off, an individual would have been required to personally confront the fire.
According to the fire marshal’s report, it was revealed that the tank farm lacked an automatic sprinkler system. In addition, the on-call fire team at the facility was several minutes away. Realizing the urgency of the situation, the supervisor from ITC swiftly made his way towards the nearest firefighting station. As he approached, he noticed that tank 80-8 was positioned right in the heart of the raging inferno.
When he arrived at the company firefighting station, the flames had spread from the bottom of the 40-foot tank to its top.
The operator in charge of the “2nd 80’s” that day was already present, fully clad in protective firefighting gear. Both the operator and the supervisor were unable to directly aim at the fire, so they attempted to redirect water from another tank onto 80-8 by bouncing it off.
However, the water pressure proved insufficient to extinguish the flames.
While the operator desperately shouted into his radio, pleading for increased water pressure, his eyes widened in horror as he witnessed another tank, labeled as 80-11, burst into flames.
A massive fireball, fueled by gas, ascended over 150 feet skyward. Emergency responders battled its rapid expansion while being showered with falling ash. An immense plume of dense, black smoke billowed and stretched far and wide, visible from miles away.
While working a few miles away from ITC on that particular Sunday, Eddie Guevara observed its movement towards his family’s residence. Despite warning his father and brother about the situation, he continued his work, having grown accustomed to the risks associated with his job.
That day, Ford, the specialist in tanks for Region 6, conducted inspections on tanks in Louisiana. Upon her return to the office, she discovered that the region’s leaders were engaged in closed-door meetings. Excluded from these discussions, she took it upon herself to independently investigate the fire.
She expressed her surprise at the occurrence of an explosion or fire in a facility that she had inspected or was familiar with. The crucial inquiry concerned whether the management attempted to evade accountability for neglecting to carry out necessary actions based on previous inspections.
She stated that only the individuals present in the room would possess the knowledge.
Texas Tribune reporters Alejandra Martinez and Erin Douglas contributed to this story.
The Investigative Reporting Workshop provided editing and graphics support. This project is co-published with Grist.
Disclosure: San Jacinto College and Southern Methodist University have been financial supporters of The Texas Tribune, a nonprofit, nonpartisan news organization that is funded in part by donations from members, foundations and corporate sponsors. Financial supporters play no role in the Tribune’s journalism. Find a complete list of them here.
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Correction, : An earlier version of this story incorrectly reported the dimensions of some tanks in ITC's "2nd 80's." The tanks were 40 feet tall and 120 feet in diameter.